



In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly pro-claimed, in the Universal Declaration of HumanRights, that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”1 The
subsequent half-century has made this right to seek asy-
lum an orphan right, since, despite its appearance in the
foundational human rights document, it was never adopted
by any human rights conventions and covenants that fol-
lowed. The millions who face persecution have discovered
that their right to seek asylum is one that states are not
necessarily prepared to protect.
Instead of addressing how people fleeing persecution
might seek asylum in other countries, the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees focused on the obliga-
tion of states not to refoule a refugee to persecution.2 The
challenge of getting out of the country in which one fears
persecution and into (or to the door of) a country of po-
tential asylum is left up to the refugee. States, meanwhile,
have emphasized their right to protect their borders and
decide who enters their territory.
For many years, Canada, like other states, has been in-
creasing the obstacles facing persecuted people who try to
seek asylum in other countries.3 These endeavours are
known as “interdiction,” described by Citizenship and Im-
migration Canada as “activities to prevent the illegal move-
ment of people to Canada, including application of visa
requirements, airline training and liaison, systems devel-
opment, intelligence-sharing with other agencies, and spe-
cific interdiction operations.”4 Other measures that can be
included under the rubric of interdiction are
• blocking of “suspicious” foreigners in airports or
points of departure for the country, by the police of
the country of departure, by immigration officials of
the interdicting country, or by the staff of the trans-
portation company
• training by the interdicting country for police offic-
ers or immigration officials in the countries of de-
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parture on how to detect false documents and how
to identify “suspicious” foreigners
• applying sanctions against transportation companies
for allowing foreigners to arrive in the country with-
out adequate documentation for entry
• blocking and sending back “suspicious” foreigners
from the airports of the interdicting country
• “deterring” foreigners on their arrival, no matter what
their status (harassment, detention, etc.)
• returning refugee claimants to countries of transit
through use of the concepts of “safe third country”
or “country of first asylum”
• negotiating with countries of transit so that they take
every possible measure to prevent foreigners from
passing through their territory en route to the inter-
dicting country
• supporting measures to block flows of refugees in “in-
ternational security zones” created in the territory of
the country they are fleeing from.5
In a paper prepared in 2000, the unhcr has used the
term interception and defined it more narrowly as “encom-
passing all measures applied by a State, outside its national
territory, in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the move-
ment of persons without the required documentation
crossing international borders by land, air or sea, and mak-
ing their way to the country of prospective destination.”6
These measures are aimed against people who may be
trying to enter Canada for a range of reasons, but inevita-
bly among those affected are refugees, who very often have
no choice but to use illegal means of flight.7 The higher the
fences created by interdiction, the more refugees are forced
to turn to smugglers to help them overcome the barriers
(and the more the smugglers charge them for their services).
The Bill c-31 package announced by the Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration on 6 April 2000 clearly shows a
continuing commitment by the Canadian government to
reinforcing interdiction. Even if there is a modest attempt
to reduce the impact of the measures on refugees, the over-
whelming force of the proposed changes runs counter to
the basic human right to seek asylum from persecution.
The following are the main elements relevant to inter-
diction in Bill c-31, in the proposed regulations and in the
accompanying announcement.
1. Increases in Penalties for Offences Related to
Illegal Entry
Bill c-31 dramatically increases the penalties associated with
most offences against the Act. For example, using a false
document to enter Canada is currently punishable by a
maximum fine of $5,000 or a maximum prison sentence
of two years (for a conviction on indictment), or by a $1,000
fine or a six-month sentence (for a summary conviction).8
Under Bill c-31, simply possessing “a passport, visa or other
document, of Canadian or foreign origin, that purports to
establish or that could be used to establish a person’s iden-
tity” in order to contravene the Act brings a term of im-
prisonment of up to five years (for a conviction on indict-
ment).9 If the person actually uses the document, the per-
son becomes liable to imprisonment of up to fourteen
years.10
There are also increased penalties for anyone who or-
ganizes a person’s illegal entry into Canada. Under the cur-
rent Act the penalties are fines of up to $100,000 or impris-
onment of up to five years (on indictment).11 For smug-
gling a group of ten or more persons, the penalties rise to
up to $500,000 or imprisonment of up to ten years.12 Un-
der Bill c-31, the penalties for a first smuggling offence are
up to $500,000 in fines and up to ten years in prison (for
smuggling fewer than ten people) and up to $1,000,000 in
fines and up to life imprisonment (for smuggling a group
of ten or more persons).13
2. New Offences for Trafficking
Bill c-31 also contains new offences for trafficking in per-
sons, reflecting an increased international preoccupation
with this serious human rights problem. Statute 111(1) states,
“No person shall knowingly organize the coming into
Canada of one or more persons by means of threat, force,
abduction, fraud, deception or coercion.” The penalty for
this offence is up to $1 million in fines and up to life im-
prisonment.14
3. Impact of Lack of Identity Documents in the
Refugee Determination System
Under Bill c-31, when Immigration and Refugee Board
(irb) members are determining refugee status and consid-
ering a claimant’s credibility, they would be required to take
into account “the fact that the claimant does not possess
documentation establishing identity, has not provided a
reasonable explanation for the lack of documentation and
has not taken reasonable steps to obtain the documenta-
tion.”15 Since the irb already follows this practice, there is
no reason to include this particular point, except as a way
of sending a message about the unwelcomeness of refugee
claimants who arrive without identity documents (and
about Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s determina-
tion to confuse lack of documentation with lack of cred-
ibility). The government’s clause-by-clause analysis makes
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plain the connection with interdiction: “This provision is
one element of the general policy in relation to undocu-
mented and uncooperative arrivals. It broadens the cur-
rent approach to undocumented claimants which focuses
on the destruction or disposal of identity documents with-
out valid reason.”16
4. Safe Third Country Provisions
A measure of interdiction that has been particularly popu-
lar in Europe is the concept of “safe third country,” by which
refugee claimants can be interdicted at a country’s border
if they have come from a country deemed “safe” for refu-
gees. The current Canadian Immigration Act already pro-
vides for denial of access to the refugee determination sys-
tem for persons who have come from a country other than
the country of origin deemed to be “safe,” although the
provision has never been put into effect.17 S. 53(2) specifies
that such persons can be removed only to a prescribed safe
third country, unless the person has been refused refugee
status by the Immigration and Refugee Board. Under Bill
c-31, however, it would be possible for a person who had
been refused refugee status by a “safe third country” to be
sent to any country, including the country of origin, with-
out having access to any assessment by Canadian authori-
ties of the risks to the person.18 Canada would thus be sub-
stituting a determination by another country for a Cana-
dian determination, despite the differences between Canada
and other countries’ laws, processes, and jurisprudence (and
without regard to the length of time that might have passed
since the other country determined that the person was
not a refugee).
5. Detention
Bill c-31 increases the government’s powers of detention,
enabling detention for administrative convenience (s. 50)
and expanding provisions for detention without warrant
(s. 51(2)) and for detention on grounds of identity (s.
51(2)(b)). Detention can be characterized as an interdic-
tion measure, because it acts as a deterrent, and facilitates
the eventual removal of those detained. Furthermore, pro-
posals for regulations listing factors for decision makers to
consider in relation to grounds for detention specifically
refer to mode of arrival: “[t]he definition of warranted fear
of flight will include explicit reference to claimants arriv-
ing as part of a criminally organized smuggling or traffick-
ing operation.”19
There is in fact no obvious relationship between arrival
with smugglers’ help and risk of flight. Experience shows
that some people, including refugee claimants, who arrive
without recourse to criminal smugglers, never appear,
whereas others, including many refugees who have no
choice but to use smugglers, can be relied upon to show up
for all their immigration proceedings. Mode of arrival is
not a relevant factor in determining flight risk. The assump-
tion of such a relationship does, on the other hand, speak
to the government’s preoccupation with interdicting the
“improperly documented.”
6. Increasing Resources for Interdiction
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration’s April 6,
2000, announcement of Bill c-31 contained a number of
undertakings that did not require legislative change. Among
them was a promise to provide “increased overseas inter-
diction,” glossed as “more immigration control officers sta-
tioned at our offices abroad,” motivated by the desire “to
discourage those not in need of protection from coming to
Canada through irregular means.”20
7. Discourse of Abuse
The government’s presentation of the proposed new legis-
lation put the accent on tightening enforcement measures
in order to combat abuse. The first sentence of the press
release set the tone: “Elinor Caplan, Minister of Citizen-
ship and Immigration, today introduced a new Immigra-
tion and Refugee Protection Act designed to curb criminal
abuse of the immigration and refugee systems while ex-
panding policies to attract the world’s best and brightest to
Canada.”21 The goal of cracking down on abuse came first
and captured most of the reader’s attention. Government
priorities were confirmed in the arrangement and scope of
the backgrounders “Closing the Back Door . . . ” (which
came first, comprising four pages) and “Opening the Front
Door Wider” (which came second, and took up two pages).
The Minister’s main message was also made clear by her
opening remarks in the press conference: “I will not mince
words: this is a tough bill.”22
The emphasis upon enforcement in the bill’s packaging
set the stage for increased interdiction measures. As
François Crépeau has argued, winning over the public is a
prerequisite for a successful interdiction program. Review-
ing the history of the “illegitimacy transfer” by which refu-
gees became linked with international criminality, he has
argued that “[a]ltering public opinion was probably the
major challenge facing immigration control administra-
tions during the ’80s and, coupled with an economic situ-
ation which weakened social consensus and polarized the
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fears of many, these administrations succeeded in denigrat-
ing the image of the asylum-seeker, associating it to that of
the defrauder.”23
8. Alternatives for Refugees
The Bill c-31 package does contain one small but signifi-
cant new element: an acknowledgement that refugees are
among those interdicted and are in need of protection. The
government promises us that duties of the more numer-
ous immigration control officers abroad will include di-
recting “genuine refugees to appropriate missions or inter-
national organizations.”24 Anyone at all familiar with the
challenges of refugee protection must at least raise an eye-
brow at this proposed response to interdicted refugees, since
neither Canadian missions, nor international organizations
(read unhcr) are realistically in a position to protect refu-
gees at risk of refoulement following interdiction. Still, the
door has been opened to a discussion of the impact of in-
terdiction on refugees.
Interdiction in Canada
The interdiction measures proposed in the Bill c-31 pack-
age do not come as any surprise: on the contrary, they con-
tinue a solid tradition within Canadian immigration policy
and practice. Citizenship and Immigration boasts of being
“a world leader in developing interdiction strategies against
illegal migration.”25 The illegitimacy associated with “ille-
gal migration” has long been transferred by Canadian offi-
cials to the refugee claims of those who arrive “illegally.”
For example, an immigration official wrote in 1992 to the
Canadian Council for Refugees explaining that “[o]ur view
on transportation company liability, a view which is shared
by many countries in the international community, is that
sanctions are needed to control illegal migration and to
protect the integrity of the visa control system. The un-
controlled movement of migrants has serious implications
not only for Canadian taxpayers, but also for legitimate
refugee claimants who must join those migrating for strictly
economic reasons in the already crowded refugee status de-
termination system.”26 Legitimate refugee claimants, we are
to understand, do not come through “illegal migration” and
therefore are not affected by interdiction measures. How
the “legitimate refugee claimants” get to Canada to make
their claim is a question that goes unanswered.
Recent years have seen an increasing focus on criminal
aspects of smuggling, representing a raising of the ante.
Now refugee claimants who use smugglers to get to Canada
are not only associated with “illegality” but also with
“criminality.”
For example, in August 1998, Solicitor General Andy
Scott released highlights of a major study on organized
crime. It looked at illicit drugs, environmental crime, con-
traband, economic crime, migrant trafficking, counterfeit
products, motor vehicle theft, and money laundering.
Among the key findings of the study was that the costs as-
sociated with migrant trafficking to Canada were estimated
at between $120 million and $400 million per year (involv-
ing approximately 8,000 to 16,000 people arriving each
year.)27 From a review of the study’s highlights (the full study
was not made public), it is apparent that the figures were
based on errors of fact supplied by “experts,” and on ques-
tionable assumptions.28 Nevertheless, although the esti-
mated costs were large, they were minuscule compared to
the estimated costs of other organized crime covered in
the study (for example, estimates of the costs of illicit drugs
to Canadians ranged from $1.4 billion per year to $4 bil-
lion, just for Canada’s three most populous provinces, and
it was estimated that $5 billion to $17 billion was laundered
in Canada each year). Yet media coverage of the announce-
ment focused not on the most costly forms of organized
criminal activity, but on people smuggling. The Canadian
Council for Refugees wrote to the Solicitor General about
the report, declaring itself “extremely disturbed by the parts
relating to refugees, which are very weak in terms of fact
and analysis, fail to take account of Canada’s international
human rights obligations and tend to promote xenopho-
bia against refugees.”29
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
and Protocols
The increasing focus on the criminal aspects of smuggling
is by no means purely a Canadian phenomenon. In 1998
the United Nations General Assembly voted to begin de-
veloping a convention against transnational organized
crime. The three first protocols to the Convention, drafted
simultaneously with the Convention, were on firearms, traf-
ficking in persons, and migrant smuggling.30 In December
2000, the Convention and the two last protocols were signed
in Palermo, Italy.
One may ask why, out of all the kinds of transnational
organized crime, the international community decided to
put among its first priorities the issues of trafficking in
persons and migrant smuggling, investing significant
amounts of money to ensure an early completion of nego-
tiations. One reason is undoubtedly a growing international
concern about trafficking in women and children.
The rise in trafficking (or in attention paid to it) has led
in recent years to the drawing of a distinction between
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smuggling and trafficking. The Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration of Canada has described the distinction in
the following way: “Human smuggling has been around
for a while. It is a fee-for-service operation, involving sim-
ple payment for passage, and we all know that it is some-
times used by genuine refugees. Human trafficking, how-
ever, is more akin to human slavery. Its goal is profit from
indentured human servitude.”31
Trafficking is clearly a very serious human rights prob-
lem, involving gross exploitation (often sexual) of its vic-
tims. Yet, as mentioned in the preamble to the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Es-
pecially Women and Children, “despite the existence of a
variety of international instruments containing rules and
practical measures to combat the exploitation of persons,
especially women and children, there is no universal instru-
ment that addresses all aspects of trafficking in persons.”32
But is a protocol to the Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime the right context for developing such an
instrument? The focus of the protocol is necessarily on
combating criminal actions rather than on protecting the
human rights of the victims. Despite the inclusion within
the Protocol of a purpose “to protect and assist the victims
of such trafficking, with full respect for their human
rights,”33 the Protocol is framed in such a way that traf-
ficked persons discovered by the authorities may continue
to be arrested, detained, and deported back to their home
country. References to particular assistance to victims of
trafficking are leavened with such weak phrases as “in ap-
propriate cases and to the extent possible,” with the result
that states signing the protocol commit themselves to no
concrete assistance to trafficked persons.
The Bill c-31 package shows us what the Protocol will
likely lead to: the criminalization of trafficking, with no
measure to give special protection or assistance to the vic-
tims of trafficking (or even identify who the victims of traf-
ficking are).
In fact, a person’s status as a victim of trafficking can
lead to particularly harsh treatment. The notion that traf-
ficked persons should be detained for their own protection
has been borrowed by Canada from the U.S. It was used
against the Chinese refugee claimants who arrived by boat
on the Canadian West Coast in the summer of 1999. The
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration explained the gov-
ernment’s position as follows: “As many of you know, the
Immigration Act currently permits three grounds for de-
tention: failure to establish identity; reasonable concern for
public safety; and warranted fear of flight. This section of
the Act has allowed us to detain most of last summer’s boat
arrivals, and thereby achieve two goals. We have cut the
traffickers off from the source of their profits, and offered
a measure of protection to their victims, as they receive a
fair hearing on their refugee claims.”34
The latter argument has also been made about minors
suspected of being vulnerable to traffickers: in this case it
is contended that the state’s responsibility for protecting
the best interests of the minors necessitates detention. This
line of reasoning is incorporated into the Bill c-31 package.
Among special factors to be considered in the detention of
minors, the proposals for regulations list the “possibility of
continuing control of the minors by criminally organized
smugglers or traffickers who brought them to Canada.” The
government explains that this is being done in order to
“treat minors in a manner consistent with their best inter-
ests, including protection from exploitation, whether by
smugglers or other unscrupulous individuals.”35
The fact that governments of the West could argue that
victims of trafficking should be “protected” by being de-
prived of their fundamental right to liberty is no doubt
linked to the fact that the victims are foreign and racialized.
The rhetorical advantage of dealing with trafficking is
that governments can take the moral high ground while
increasing measures to combat illegal immigration. In the
matter of smuggling more generally, the role of victim is
assigned to the Western countries that people attempt to
enter. The Australians, for example, appear to have per-
suaded themselves that they are particularly vulnerable to
the dangers of invading hordes of foreigners (although as
an island in the middle of an ocean, one might have thought
Australia one of the least “vulnerable” countries). In June
1999 the Report of the Prime Minister’s Coastal Surveillance
Task Force was finalized: it called for the Australian De-
fence Force to be involved in the defence of Australia’s bor-
ders against illegal immigrants. The report uses the lan-
guage of military threat in discussing possible arrivals of
smuggled persons. For example, paragraph 8 states that
“[t]he level and geographic location of our representation
overseas should be reviewed at regular intervals to meet
the ever changing threat.”36 A similar sense of vulnerability
is conveyed by a judge of the Federal Court of Australia,
speaking at a conference of refugee law judges: “Our geo-
graphic position, a large land mass surrounded by water,
difficulties of coast line patrol and a high standard of liv-
ing in a democratic society, make us a prime target for less
fortunate people who leave the shores of their native lands,
come to Australia and claim refugee status.”37
Protecting the borders from those people who would
try to enter without permission is a priority for many gov-
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ernments in addition to the Australian. This is presumably
one reason that smuggling and trafficking protocols were
so high on the governments’ agenda (or at least the gov-
ernments of the West). It can also explain why the traffick-
ing protocol gives disproportionate attention to the cross-
ing of the border. Trafficking does not necessarily involve
illegal border crossing: trafficked persons may enter a coun-
try with a valid visitor visa, employment authorization, or
even potentially permanent residence (if, for example, a
mail-order bride program were used for trafficking pur-
poses). Trafficking need not always even involve crossing a
border at all. Victims of trafficking who do cross a border,
whether legally or illegally, need to be detected and res-
cued from inside the country (where they may be kept in
illegal detention by their traffickers). Yet the Protocol’s en-
forcement measures are aimed almost exclusively at the
border, with articles called “Border Measures,” “Security and
Control of Documents,” and “Legitimacy and Validity of
Documents.”38 Even the article dealing with issues of train-
ing and exchange of information is largely devoted to bor-
der-related issues.
Bill c-31 reflects the same obsession with protecting the
border. The increase in penalties for border-related offences
makes an assault on the border equivalent to an assault on
a person: organizing the entry of ten or more people (pun-
ishable by up to life imprisonment) is put on a par with
taking a person’s life or aggravated sexual assault; using a
false passport to enter Canada (punishable by up to four-
teen years’ imprisonment) is made equivalent to wound-
ing with intent.
Meanwhile, the rights of people trying to get to the bor-
der in order to save their lives count for little in the twilight
zone between borders.
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